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I.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of Case

This case arises from a dispute regarding the constitutionality of Idaho Code § 58-31 OA
under Article IX, Section 8, of the Idaho Constitution. Article IX, Section 8, addresses the disposal
of public lands. Moreover, Article IX, Section 8, pronounces two important directives: first, state
lands must be managed "in such a manner as will secure the maximum long-term financial return to
the institution to which granted;" second, state lands must be "carefully preserved and held in trust,
subject to disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the respective object for which said
grants of land were made." Id. Specifically, this dispute arises from Idaho Code § 58-31 O's
directive that "when two (2) or more people apply to lease the same land the director of the
department of lands ... shall ... auction off and lease the land to the applicant who will pay the
highest premium bid therefore," and Idaho Code § 58-310A's exemption of single family,
recreational cottage site, and home site leases from the conflict application and auction procedures of
Idaho Code § 58-310. In the absence of conflict auction procedures and consistent with Article IX,
Section 8's directives, the State Board of Land Commissioners (hereinafter "Land Board") is
directed to "insure each leased lot generates market rent throughout the duration of the lease." I.e.

§ 58-3 lOA.
The Attorney General brought this action arguing that the Idaho Code § 58-31 OA cottage site
lease exemption is unconstitutional under Article IX, Section 8' s directive that state lands be
"subject to disposal at public auction." Idaho Const. art. IX, § 8. (Emphasis added). The district
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court disagreed with the Attorney General's argument and held, in part, I that "public auctions are not
required for leases of public lands because the term 'disposal' contained in Article IX, Section 8 of
the Idaho Constitution does not include leases." R. Addendum, p. 36, LL. 1-4. The Attorney
General has appealed the district court's decision.

B.

Factual and Procedural Background

Article IX, Section 7, of the Idaho Constitution provides that the governor, superintendant of
public instruction, secretary of state, attorney general, and state controller shall constitute the Land
Board. The same provision charges the Land Board with the direction, control, and disposition of
the public lands of the state, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. Id. Article IX,
Section 8, of the Idaho Constitution addresses the disposition of public lands:
It shall be the duty of the state board of land commissioners to provide for the
location, protection, sale or rental of all the lands heretofore, or which may hereafter
be granted to or acquired by the state by or from the general government, under such
regulations as may be prescribed by law, and in such manner as will secure the
maximum long-term financial return to the institution to which granted or to the state
ifnot specifically granted; provided, that no state lands shall be sold for less than the
appraised price. No law shall ever be passed by the legislature granting any
privileges to persons who may have settled upon any such public lands, subsequent
to the survey thereof by the general government, by which the amount to be derived
by the sale, or other disposition of such lands, shall be diminished, directly or
indirectly. The legislature shall, at the earliest practicable period, provide by law that
the general grants of land made by congress to the state shall be judiciously located
and carefully preserved and held in trust, subject to disposal at public auction for the
use and benefit of the respective object for which said grants ofland were made, and

I In addition, the district court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract
Claims and granted Defendants' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Contract Claims,
thereby requiring Plaintiffs to first pursue those claims under the Administrative Procedures Act. R.
Addendum, p. 40, LL.13-16. The district court's denial of Plaintiffs' Motion is the subject of CrossAppellants' Opening BriefRe: Cross-Appeal of the Contract Claims, which is submitted separately
from this brief.
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the legislature shall provide for the sale of said lands from time to time and for the
sale of timber on all state lands and for the faithful application of the proceeds
thereof in accordance with the terms of said grants; provided, that not to exceed one
hundred sections of state lands shall be sold in anyone year, and to be sold in
subdivisions of not to exceed three hundred twenty acres of land to anyone
individual, company or corporation. The legislature shall have power to authorize
the state board of land commissioners to exchange granted or acquired lands of the
state on an equal value basis for other lands under agreement with the United States,
local units of government, corporations, companies, individuals, or combinations
thereof.
(Emphasis added).
Following Idaho's admission to the Union, the Idaho Legislature adopted a statute that
provided when two or more persons apply to lease the same state lands, the Commissioner of the
Department of Lands shall auction off the lease to the applicant who will pay the highest annual
rental amount. East Side Blaine County Live Stock Ass 'n v. State Bd. of Land Comm 'rs, 34 Idaho
807,809,198 P. 760, 762 (1921), citing C.S. § 2910. This statute still exists today as Idaho Code

§ 58-310, albeit with some amendments.
The cottage sites at issue are owned by the State ofIdaho in fee simple, and they are held in
trust "for the benefit of the public schools ... and the state hospital [hereinafter "the Beneficiaries]."
Wasden ex rei. State v. State Bd. ofLand Comm 'rs, 150 Idaho 547, 549, 249 P.3d 346, 348 (2010).

The Land Board first "began renting cottage sites ... in 1924," but most sites were not rented until
the 1940s and 1950s. Id. "From 1945 to 1988 cottage sites were leased for flat rates, with sporadic
adjustments .... " Id. In 1990, the Idaho Legislature adopted Idaho Code § 58-31 OA, which
exempted cottage site leases from the conflict auction provisions of Idaho Code § 58-310 and
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imposed on the Land Board the requirement to generate market rent throughout the duration ofthe
lease term. I.C. § 58-3 lOA.
On January 1,2001, the Land Board entered into 1O-year cottage site leases with the lessees
(hereinafter "the Lessees"). R. Exh. 9 (Aff. ofW. Anthony Park, ~~ 1, 18, and Exh. N). The leases
provided for rent at the rate of 2.5% of the current fee simple value of the leased premises as
determined by the Valley County Assessor. R. Exh. 9, Exh. N at D .1.1 and D .l.5b. The Land Board
reserved the right to increase or decrease the rent paid effective January 1 of any calendar year in
accordance with the 2.5% rental rate formula and with 180 days' advance notice of any increase in
rent. Id. at D.l.4. The leases further provided that upon sale of a leasehold, Lessees would pay the
Land Board 10% of any leasehold value 2 realized from the sale. Id. at E.l.3. b. This 10% figure was
referred to in the lease as "premium rent." Id.
In February 2010, a Cottage Site Subcommittee, comprised of Secretary of State Y sursa and
Superintendant Luna, presented its recommendations to the Land Board concerning the rental rate to
be utilized for the upcoming 2011 cottage site leases. R. Exh. 11 (Aff. of Phillip S. Oberrecht, Exhs.
A, B). The Subcommittee recommended an annual lease rate of 4% of the appraised value of the
leasehold, which appraised value would be averaged over a 1O-year period. Id. The increase from
2.5% to 4% would be phased in over a five-year period. Id. The Subcommittee also recommended
that premium rent be increased from 10% of the leasehold value to 50% of the leasehold value,
which increase would also be phased in over a five-year period. Id.

Leasehold value is determined by subtracting the value of approved lessee-owned improvements
from the total sale price. R. Exh. 9, Exh. N at E.1.3b.

2
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The Subcommittee's recommendations were based on a study commissioned by Secretary
Ysursa in January 2008 from the University of Idaho Policy Analysis Group. R. Exh. 2 (Aff. of
Steven Strack, Exh. C). The study concluded that identifying market rent for the leases was
challenging due to the unusual characteristics of the market for such leases and that there were
arguments for both higher and lower rental rates. !d., p. 2. The Policy Analysis Group concluded
there was unlikely to be a simple "correct" answer concerning market rent, and offered suggestions
for possible market rents ranging between 3.5% and 18.3%. ld., pp. 2,22-23.
The Attorney General did not believe the Subcommittee's recommendations accurately
reflected market rent and retained an economist to analyze the Subcommittee's recommendations
and testify at the February 2010 meeting. R. Exh. 11, Exh. Cat 72:2058-2061,72:2075-73:2092.
The economist testified (1) that the Land Board's goal should be to increase rents to the point the
leasehold value disappears, which would require a rental rate of 6% instead of the 4% recommended
by the Subcommittee, and (2) that the entire increase be made effective the first year of the 2011
lease. ld. at 75:2160-77:2223.
A further study was conducted, and completely ignored by the Land Board and the Attorney
General. That study is the Final Summary Appraisal and Consulting Report, Market Rental Rate of
Return Study that was prepared by Licensed Appraisers for the Department of Lands, the Priest Lake
Lessees, and the Payette Lake Lessees. R. Exh. 11, Exh 1. This study was provided to the Land
Board in advance of its February 2010 meeting and was the subject of Board discussion during the
meeting. The purpose of the study was to "estimate an appropriate rate of return to multiply times
property value in order to arrive at the Market Rent of the subject cottage site leases." R. Exh. 11,
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Exh I, p. 2. Due to "anomalies with regard to the rentals regarding seasonal characteristics and other
factors," the study produced a graduated market rental schedule for Payette Lake Cottage sites where
"the highest valued sites would rent at a level of 1% of assessor's market value and the lowest
valued sites would rent at a level of 4%." Id., p. 10.
At the conclusion of public testimony during the February 2010 meeting, Secretary Ysursa
made a motion to adopt the Subcommittee's recommendations. R. Exh. 11, Exh. C at 109:31543140. The Attorney General opposed the motion on the basis that he believed his economist's
recommendations were correct. Id. at 118:3390-3403, 121 :3467-3481. No contention was raised
during the February 2010 meeting that Idaho Code § 58-310A was unconstitutional, nor was any
suggestion or motion made to subject the 2011 leases to conflict auctions. Id. The Land Board
voted to defer a decision on the rental rate and premium rent increase for one month. Id., Exh. A,
p.5.
At the Land Board's March 2010 meeting, the Subcommittee presented essentially the same
recommendations for the rental rate, and recommended that the premium rent be calculated as 10%
of gross leasehold value or 50% of net leasehold value, whichever is greater. Id., Exh. D, p. 5. The
Land Board adopted the recommendations, with the Attorney General voting in opposition to the
motion. Id. Again, no mention was made concerning the constitutionality ofIdaho Code § 58-310A
or conflict auctions of cottage site leases. See generalZv R. Exh. 11, Exh. D.
Eight days after the Land Board's March 2010 meeting, the Attorney General filed a Verified
Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Prohibition in the Idaho Supreme Court against his fellow Land
Board Members and the Director ofthe Idaho Department of Lands. !d., Exh. E; see Wasden ex ref.
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State, 150 Idaho 547, 249 P.3d 346. The Attorney General sought a Writ prohibiting the Land Board

and the Department from implementing the recently approved rental rates because the rents were too
low and therefore failed to achieve market rent. Jd.,

~

35. The Attorney General alleged the Land

Board should have set rates at the 6% figure advocated by his economist. Jd.,

~'l27,

34-35 The

Petition was fully briefed and argued, and the Idaho Supreme Court issued its Opinion December 1,
2010, dismissing the Attorney General's Writ because a plain, speedy and adequate remedy was
available through declaratory and injunctive relief. Jd., p. 11; Wasden ex ref State, 150 Idaho at 554,
249 P.3d at 353.
One day after the Supreme Court issued its Opinion, the Attorney General filed a Complaint
against his fellow Land Board Members and the Director of the Department of Lands in Ada County
District Court. R. Vol. I, p. 30 (Complaint, Case No. CV OC 1023751).3 The Attorney General
alleged for the first time that Idaho Code § 58-31 OA was unconstitutional because it permitted
issuance of cottage site leases without resorting to conflict auctions, which he contended were
required for state land leases under Article IX, Section 8, of the Idaho Constitution. R. Vol. 1. pp.
45-46. The Attorney General also sought a preliminary injunction preventing the Land Board and
the Department from implementing the lease rates approved at the Land Board's March 2010
meeting, and raised an alternative claim that the rental rate set by the Land Board violated Idaho

3 This matter was subsequently consolidated with the prior action filed in Valley County by the
Payette Lake Lessees. R. Vol. III, p. 562, L. 15.
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Code § 58-31 OA because it did not generate market rent throughout the duration of the lease term. 4
R. Vol. I, pp. 46-47.
The Land Board met four days later and approved offering existing Lessees a one-year lease
on the existing lease terms and conditions, to commence January 1,2011. R. Exh. 11, Exh. G, p. 5.
The Land Board also approved notifying leaseholders that the 20 12 lease would be offered at a rental
rate of 4% with no premium rent. Id., pp. 5-6. The Attorney General voted in favor of both motions.

Id
The Attorney General then filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking a declaration that
Idaho Code § 58-31 OA is unconstitutional because it does not require cottage site leases to be
awarded subject to conflict auction procedures. See R. Addendum, pp. 22-40. In response, the
district court, held (1) that "public auctions are not required for leases of public lands because the
term' disposal' contained in Article IX, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution does not contain leases;"
and (2) that the Attorney General had not carried his burden of demonstrating facial
unconstitutionality because "it is possible that the Land Board could secure maximum long term
financial return for the endowment land[']s [B]eneficiaries as mandated under Article IX, Section 8
of the Idaho Constitution without subjecting the cottage site leases to a public auction." R.
Addendum, pp. 40, LL. 2-5. As a result of the holding, the district court granted the Attorney
General's Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Constitutionality ofIdaho Code § 58-310A, and an

The Motion for Preliminary Injunction was heard and granted on December 15,2010. The written
order prohibited the Director of the Department of Lands from implementing the leases approved at
the Land Board's March 2010 meeting, and ordered that the existing Lessees would remain in
possession under the existing lease terms and conditions. R. Vol. II, pp. 224-26.
4
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Entry of Final Judgment as per I.R.C.P. 54 was entered on August 10,2011. R. Vol. IV, p. 716, L.
12-15.
The Attorney General thereafter appealed the final judgment regarding the constitutionality
of Idaho Code § 58-31 OA, and the Lessees cross-appealed the district court's grant of summary
judgment on the Lessees' contract claims in favor of the Land Board. R. Vol. IV, p. 687, L. 1. For
clarity, the Lessees submit these briefs separately as to the constitutional claims and the contract
claims. This brief is presented in response to the Attorney General's opening briefregarding the
constitutionality of Idaho Code § 58-31 OA.

II.

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether Idaho Code § 58-310A's exemption of cottage site leases from conflict auctions
can be interpreted harmoniously with Article IX, Section 8, of the Idaho Constitution?

III.
A.

ARGUMENT

Standard of Review
In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court utilizes the same

standard of review used by the district court. Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hasp., 147
Idaho 109, 112,206 P.3d 473, 476 (2009). Summary judgment is proper only "if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw."
I.R.c.P. 56( c). The burden of establishing there is no genuine issue of material fact is on the moving
party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 531, 887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994). "If
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there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over which this Court
exercises free review." Jones, 147 Idaho at 112,206 P.3d at 476. Further, the Jones Court stated:
It is axiomatic that upon a motion for summary judgment the non-moving party may

not rely upon its pleadings, but must come forward with evidence by way of affidavit
or otherwise which contradicts the evidence submitted by the moving party, and
which establishes the existence of a material issue of disputed fact. This Court
liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party, and all
reasonable inferences drawn from the record will be drawn in favor of the
nonmoving party. If reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw
conflicting inferences from the evidence presented, then summary judgment is
Improper.

Id. (Citations omitted).
B.

The Term "Disposal" Does Not Encompass Cottage Site Leases Under Article IX,
Section 8, of the Idaho Constitution
1.

The Application of Constitutional Construction Rules Demonstrate that the Term
"Disposal" in Article IX, Section 8, Does Not Encompass Cottage Site Leases

"The same rules apply to the construction of constitutional provisions as are applied to the
construction of statutes." Higer v. Hansen, 67 Idaho 45, 52, 170 P .2d 411,415 (1946). "Whenever
the language of a constitutional provision is plain, simple, direct and unambiguous, it does not
require construction-it construes itself." Id. The Framers of our constitution must be understood to
have employed words in their natural and ordinary sense, and to have intended what they have said.

Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135,139,804 P.2d 308, 312 (1990). "Where terms ofa constitutional
provision are not entirely free from doubt, they must be interpreted as nearly as possible in
consonance with the objects and purposes in contemplation at the time of their adoption." Riger, 67
Idaho at 53, 170 P .2d at 415. This Court has utilized three tools of constitutional interpretation when
such terms are not free from doubt: (1) the "conditions existing prior to and at the time" the
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provision was adopted; (2) the "debates in a constitutional convention;" and (3) "the printed
arguments for and against the provision submitted to the people at the polls." Id.
a.

The Plain, Simple, Direct, and Unambiguous Meaning of "Disposal" Does
Not Encompass Cottage Site Leases

When interpreting the plain meaning of text, this Court utilizes commonly used dictionaries.

Cordova v. Bonneville County Joint Sch. Dis!. No. 93, 144 Idaho 637, 641, 167 P.3d 774, 778
(2007). Black's Law Dictionary defines the word "disposal" as the "sale, pledge, giving away, use,
consumption or any other disposition of a thing." Black's Law Dictionary 471 (6 th ed. 1990).
Similarly, Webster's II New College Dictionary defines "dispose" as "[t]o deal with conclusively,"
"[t]o transfer or part with, as by giving or selling," and "[t]o get rid of." Webster's II New College
Dictionary 329 (1995). These common definitions render but one conclusion: leases are not
encompassed in the plain, simple, direct, and unambiguous meaning of the term "disposal" or
"dispose." This conclusion is solidified by an examination of real property law and Idaho Supreme
Court precedents.
With regard to real property, a disposal involves the transfer of one's entire interest in
property, otherwise known as a fee simple interest. Compare C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763,
768,25 P.3d 76, 81 (2001) (holding that where there is no language in a deed limiting the estate
conveyed or restricting the purpose of the grant, it will be seen as conveying fee simple title), with

Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 508, 65 P.3d 525, 530 (2003) (holding that where there is language
limiting the estate conveyed, it will be seen as not conveying fee simple title); see also I.e. § 55-604
(a statutorily created presumption that fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a grant
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of real property unless it appears that a lesser estate was intended). By contrast, a lease only conveys
a leasehold interest in return for a promise to pay rent periodically. Krasselt v. Koester, 99 Idaho
124,125,578 P.2d 240, 241 (1978). A leasehold interest is comprised of contract rights and a
limited ownership interest in the real property. !d. As such, when the plain meaning of the term
"disposal" is juxtaposed with either a total or partial conveyance of real property, it supports the
conclusion that the word "disposal" does not encompass partial conveyances of real property such as
leases, but rather total conveyances where one transfers his or her entire interest in real property.
The Attorney General provides this Court with a convoluted textual analysis of Article IX,
Section 8. Appellant Lawrence G. Wasden's Opening Brief, Supreme Court Docket No. 390842011, pp. 19-22 (hereinafter "Appellant's Opening Brief').

The problem with the Attorney

General's analysis is that although he cites for authority one of the basic tenets of constitutional
construction at the outset, he continues to ignore that principal throughout his analysis:
[B]egin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain,
usual and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the
statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it but simply follows the law as
written. Unless the result is palpably absurd, we must assume that the legislature
means what is clearly stated in the statute.
Appellant's Opening Brief, p.17; Viking Const., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist., 149 Idaho 187, 192,
233 P.3d 118, 123 (2010). Rather than accept the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of "disposal,"
the Attorney Generally textually analyzes Article IX, Section 8, sentence by sentence, and comes to
numerous strained conclusions. Id. Less strained conclusions can be easily attained by utilizing the
rules of constitutional construction this Court has espoused. See Higer, Sweeney. The plain
meaning of "disposal" leads to but one logical conclusion: the disposing of endowment lands entails
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getting rid of the entire fee-not merely one stick of the bundle.

The Attorney General's

conclusions are flawed because they ignore, although cite, the basic tenets of constitutional
construction. 5
2.

Case Law Supports the Conclusion that the Term "Disposal" Does Not Encompass
Cottage Site Leases

Whether the term "disposal," or its other forms, encompasses leases has not been directly
addressed by Idaho Courts. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has undertaken analyses that are
instructive on the issue. In Rogers v. Hawley, 19 Idaho 751, 115 P. 687 (1911), this Court dealt with
the constitutionality of a statute that authorized the state to exchange school lands without resorting
to a public auction. The Rogers court held that the statute was constitutional because the exchange
did not constitute an unqualified surrender or giving away of state lands, and, therefore, did not
qualify as a disposal under the Idaho Constitution. Rogers, 19 Idaho at 754, 115 P. at 690. The
following year, this Court concluded that statutes permitting the Land Board to convey a right-ofway over state lands to a private party for irrigation purposes were constitutional, thereby implying
that the conveyance of a right-of-way was not a disposal within the meaning of Article IX Section 8.
See Tobey v. Bridgewood, 22 Idaho 566, 583, 127 P. 178, 183 (1912). Several years later, this Court

5 The Attorney General argues that Lessees' construction of disposal would exclude from Article
IX, Section 8's reach contracts to purchase because no transfer offee simple title has occurred until
the purchaser makes complete payment. Appellant's Opening Briet: p. 22, n 10. The Attorney
General's argument has no merit. The end result of a contract to purchase is the transfer of fee
simple title-the entire fee is disposed and the public auction mandate would be triggered. Ellis v.
Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644,647,570 P.2d 1334, 1337 (1977)("[T]itle does not pass to the purchaser
until all installments are paid in accordance with the contract .... "). On the other hand, the end of a
lease results in the promise to pay periodically being extinguished, the leasehold is terminated, and
the bundle of sticks is reunited. See Krasselt v. Koester, 99 Idaho 124,578 P.2d 240 (1978).
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confinned that Article IX, Section 8, only applies where the state parts with a fee interest-not
merely an easement:
By holding that said provisions of section 8 are applicable when the state parts with
the fee, and not where it grants an easement, the sections of the Constitution in
regard to the sale of school lands and of eminent domain can be made effective and
harmonious.
Idaho-Iowa Lateral & Reservoir Co., Ltd., v. Fisher, 27 Idaho 695,705,151 P. 998,1001 (1915).

These historical cases support the proposition that the tenn "disposal," used as it is commonly
understood, does not encompass right-of-ways, easements, or leases because these limited
conveyances are only temporary possessory interests-and not the conveyance away of the title to
that land.
The Attorney General cites Idaho-Iowa for the proposition that "where the sale or leasing of
endowment lands occurs and eminent domain authority has not been exercise, the public auction
strictures in Article IX, Section 8, apply. Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 31. In doing so, the
Attorney General relies heavily on the concurring opinion of Justice Morgan and the dissenting
opinion of Justice Budge, but completely disregards the actual holding of the case. Appellant's
Opening Brief, p. 30. Again, the holding of Idaho-Iowa dictates that the public auction provisions of
Article IX, Section 8, are applicable when the state parts with the fee, and not where it grants an
easement. Idaho-Iowa Lateral & Reservoir Co., Ltd., 27 Idaho at 705,151 P. at 1001.
Similarly, in Allen v. Smylie, 92 Idaho 846, 851-52,452 P.2d 343,348-49 (1969), this court
held that the Land Board had the power to initiate offers to lease, thus implying that leases were not
disposals subject to public auction. Specifically, the Allen court held that the power to grant or reject
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a lease is a discretionary power of the Land Board, and that it could not identify any legislative acts
that would prohibit the Land Board from initiating and conveying an offer to lease to a private party.
Allen, 92 Idaho at 850-52, 452 P.2d at 347-49. In reaching its decision, this Court analyzed the
language of Article IX, Section 8, but made no mention of the public auction language. Id. Rather,
this Court concluded that the power of the Land Board to initiate lease offers flowed from the
Board's obligation to lease property in such a manner as will secure the maximum amount
therefore. 6 Allen, 92 Idaho at 852, 452 P.2d at 349.
Recent interpretation of whether a lease is a "disposal" ofland does not alter this Court's
jurisprudence on the issue. Nonetheless, the Attorney General relies heavily upon the Idaho
Watershed cases (hereinafter "IWP I," "IWP II," "IWP III," and "IWP IV") to support an incorrect
position. Specifically, the Attorney General cites the Idaho Watershed cases, which held that the
Land Board was either obligated to or constrained from taking action pursuant to a state statute, and
takes the position that the Land Board was constitutionally compelled or restrained. The Attorney
General has improperly construed the Idaho Watershed cases because they were decided on statutory
grounds-and not constitutional grounds. For the readers ease, please note that IWP I, IWP III, and
IWP IVaddressed the statutory conflict auction requirements ofIdaho Code §§ 58-310 and 58-31 OB,
whereas IWP II addressed the procedural problems of a voter-approved ballot measure. These cases
will be discussed, in turn, below.

In 1982, Article IX, Section 8 was amended to replace "in such a manner as will secure the
maximum possible amount therefore" language with "in such manner as will secure the maximum
long-term financial return." H. J. R. 18, 1982 Leg.
6
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In IWP 1, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed whether the Land Board was permitted under
Idaho Code § 58-310B to award a grazing lease to an applicant who did not bid at the conflict
auction. Idaho Watersheds Project, Inc. v. State Bd. of Land Comm 'rs, 128 Idaho 761, 766, 918
P .2d 1206, 1211 (1996). The court held that while the Land Board had broad discretion to determine
what constituted the maximum long-term financial return for endowment land Beneficiaries, it did
not have the legal ability to reject the sole bid placed at a conflict auction and grant the lease to
someone who appeared but did not bid. IWP 1, 128 Idaho at 765-66, 918 P .2d at 1210-11.
The Attorney General ignores the vast majority of the IWP 1 decision and focuses on sparse
statements of the Court to support his position. First, the Attorney General focuses on a concluding
sentence that analyzed whether Idaho Code § 58-310 authorized the actions of the Land Board:
"[t]he Board does not have the discretion to grant a lease to an applicant who does not place a bid at
an auction, based upon Idaho's constitutional and statutory mandate that the Board conduct an
auction." IWP 1,128 Idaho at 768,918 P.2d at 1211; Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 23. Second, the
Attorney General focuses on the opening sentence of the Court's analysis where the arguments of
Idaho Watersheds Project, Inc., are summarized: "IWP contends that the Board violated [A]rticle
IX, section 8 .... " IWP 1, 128 Idaho at 764, 918 P.2d at 1210; Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 24.
These limited references to Idaho's Constitution are not part of the Court's holding, and are not
necessary to its decision, which is statutorily based.

Fundamentally, the holding has no

consti tutional roots. Rather, the holding is based on the lack of any legal authority to support the act
of holding a statutorily required conflict auction, but then refusing to award the lease to the only
bidder atthe conflict auction. IWP 1, 128 Idaho at 766-67, 918 P.2d at 1211-12. Unlike the present
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case, the statute violated in IWP 1 required a conflict auction Here, the statute exempted cottage site
leases from conflict auctions.
Similarly, the Attorney General uses the same invalid analyzing technique to highlight a
general statement of this Court in East Side Blaine County Live Stock Ass 'n v. State Bd. of Land
Comm 'rs, 34 Idaho 807,198 P. 760 (1921). Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 31. In East Side, a state

statute provided that if two or more individuals applied to lease the same grazing land, a conflict
auction would be held and the lease would be offered to the highest bidder. East Side, 34 Idaho at
813-14, 198 P. at 761. The Land Board had not followed the directive of the statute and had
awarded the grazing lease to a company without holding a conflict auction. Id. As with IWP I, the
statutorily created conflict auction requirement distinguishes these cases from Idaho Code § 58310A. This Court's analysis repeatedly refers to the statutory basis for the conflict auction
requirement. Here, there is no statutory basis for holding a conflict auction because Idaho Code

§ 58-31 OA does not require one.
In IWP III, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed a statute that impermissibly interfered with
the trust relationship between the Land Board and trust Beneficiaries. Idaho Watersheds Project v.
State Bd. of Land Comm 'rs, 133 Idaho 64, 982 P.2d 367 (1999). The Court held that Idaho Code

§ 58-31 OB's express direction to the Land Board to consider the interests of the state in general-in
addition to-the interests ofthe Beneficiaries, was in violation of Article IX, Section 8's directive to
maximize long-term financial returns to the Beneficiaries. IWP 111,133 Idaho at 67,982 P.2d at 370.
Similarly, in IWP IV, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho Code § 58-31 OB was unconstitutional
because it impermissibly "attempts to promote funding" for the Beneficiaries, the state, and the
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livestock industry. Idaho Watersheds Project v. State Bd. o/Land Comm 'rs, 133 Idaho 68, 71, 982
P.2d 371, 374 (1999).
The Attorney General relies on IWP 111 and IWP IV for the proposition that the Land Board
cannot take action for the benefit of anyone other than the Beneficiaries. Appellant's Opening Brief,
pp.25-26. The Lessees agree. However, the Attorney General incorrectly argues (1) that the basis
for the IWP 111 andIWP IV decisions was Idaho Code § 58-310B's non-compliance with Article IX,
Section 8' s directive that the general grants of land shall be held in trust "for the use and benefit of
the respective object for which said grants were made," and (2) that the noun "disposal" was the
antecedent of that constitutional directive. Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 25-26. According to the
Attorney General, the sum of these two arguments is the conclusion that leases are within the scope
of the term "disposal." This conclusory statement provides little support for the Attorney General's
position. As explained below, the exemption of cottage site leases from conflict auctions is not only
consistent with constitutional language, but also increases returns to the Beneficiaries by reducing
the risks to the state. Idaho Code § 58-31 OA is, therefore, consistent with the holding of IWP III and
IWPIV.

In addition to the above distinguishing factors, there are significant differences between
Idaho Code § 58-310A and Idaho Code § 58-31OB. First, Idaho Code § 58-310B was not only
adopted at a different time than Idaho Code § 58-31 OA, but also concerned grazing leases instead of
cottage site leases and required grazing leases to be subject to conflict auctions-rather than
exempting them. Second, Idaho Code § 58-31 OB directed the Land Board to consider specified
criteria before awarding a grazing lease, including directing the Land Board to make decisions that
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benefited the state in general. Although Idaho Code § 58-31OA states in its findings section that
conflict auctions have caused considerable consternation to cottage site Lessees, at no point does the
statute direct the Land Board to consider interests other than those of the Beneficiaries or to the
detriment of Beneficiaries.
Finally, in IWP II, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the procedural problems of a voterapproved ballot measure. Idaho Watersheds Project v. State Bd. of Land Comm 'rs, 133 Idaho 55,
982 P.2d 358 (1999). In IWP II, the court invalidated a voter-approved ballot measure because it
impennissibly combined separate and incongruous amendments, which was in violation of another
provision in the Idaho Constitution. IWP II, 133 Idaho at 59, 982 P.2d at 362. Specifically, one of
the amendments sought to change the word "disposal" to "sale."
The Attorney General argues that the procedurally invalidated ballot measure evidences that
the "term' disposal' in the constitutional provision extended beyond [the] 'sale' of endowment land
since, absent such a meaning, no need existed for the amendment itself." Appellant's Opening Brief,
p. 24. However, Appendix I to House Joint Resolution 6, which was adopted by the Idaho
Legislature and proposed the amendments to Article IX, Section 8, indicates otherwise. H.J.R.6,
1998 Leg. Appendix I includes a section entitled "Legislative Council's Statements of Meaning and
Purpose of Proposed Amendments." Id. These statements were drafted by the State Legislative
Council, which is made up of elected senators and representatives. In the Statements Against the
Proposed Amendments, Idaho's own elected officials conceded that the word "disposal" has
historically been interpreted to mean a sale, but that the "definition of' disposal' is still disputed."
Id. In the Statements For the Proposed Amendments, the Legislative Council stated that while a
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lease is sometimes promoted as being within the term "disposal," a lease is not a permanent decision
(i.e., disposal) and should be distinguished from a sale. Id. What is critical to recognize from
Appendix I, however, is that even though the voter-approved ballot measure was invalidated on
procedural grounds, these statements by Idaho's own legislators support the conclusion that the word
"disposal" is commonly understood, and historically known to mean, conveyances of fee title. In
other words, "disposal" is a transfer of the entire bundle of sticks, not just the stick of possession.
3.

An Analysis of Idaho's Constitutional Convention Debates and Legislative History
Demonstrates that the Term "Disposal" Does Not Encompass Cottage Site Leases

A thorough review of Idaho's constitutional convention debates and Idaho's legislative
history following admission to the Union demonstrates the Framers' intent that leases were not
"disposals." During the convention, there was vigorous debate over whether state lands should even
be subject to sale or lease. 7 Dennis C. Colson, Idaho's Constitution: The Tie That Binds, 118-121
(2003). Professor Colson's discussion focuses on the Section 4 debates, which defined the public
school fund and how proceeds from school lands were to be managed. Id. Significantly, however,
Professor Colson recognizes the important effect that Section 4 's debates had on the Section 8
debates that occurred the following day. Professor Colson states that:
Aaron Parker's absolute prohibition on sale was ultimately defeated, but his motion
had its effect. The debate produced a compromise policy. Section 8 of the article as
finally passed authorized disposal, but with conditions. The amount sold could not
exceed twenty-five sections in anyone year, it could not be sold for less than $10 per
acre, it was to be sold at public auction, and it was to be sold in subdivisions not to
exceed one hundred sixty acres to anyone individual, company or corporation.

Professor Colson's text on Idaho's constitutional conventions has been previously utilized by this
Court for determining the intent of the Framers of Idaho's Constitution. Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 136
Idaho 560, 567, 38 P.3d 598, 605 (2001).
7
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Id. at 113 (emphasis added).8 In addition to Professor Colson's recognition of the effects that
Section 4 debates had on Section 8, a closer analysis of Section 8 debates demonstrates the Framers'
intent to protect endowment lands through private trust law-and not restrain management to the use
of a single mechanism. 9 Compare I.W. Hart, Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional

Convention of Idaho 1889 703-65, 711, 732 (1910) (hereafter "Hart") (Mr. Gray arguing that the
legislature and Land Board should be given broad discretion to manage state lands and not be bound

8 Lessees agree with Professor Colson's analysis of the effect that Section 4 debates had on the
debates of Section 8. However, Lessees do not agree with Professor Colson's analysis concerning
"The Disposal of Public Auction" Issue. See Dennis C. Colson, Idaho Endowment Lands and the
Idaho Constitution 1-11 (2011), available at http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/ sessioninfo/2011
linterim /resources0829 0830 colson. pdf, at p.1O-11 (last visited Jan. 18,2012). Professor Colson's
analysis, in this regard, suffers much like that of the Attorney General's because due to the vigorous
debates among the delegates, it is unreasonable to conclude that all leases would be subject to the
public auction requirement.
9 The Attorney General argues that the "public auction" requirement and "land trust" requirement
were viewed by the Framers to prevent individuals from pillaging the endowment lands for their
personal benefit and to "insulate management" from inevitable political pressure to grant favorable
terms to potential purchasers or lessees ofthese lands. Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 33-34, n. 13.
See Dennis C. Colson, Idaho Endowment Lands and the Idaho Constitution 1-11 (2011), available at
http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/20 11 linterimlresources0829 0830 colson. pdf (last
visited Jan. 18,2012). Lessees disagree, in part. Professor Colson discusses protecting endowment
lands from politicians and speculators; however, that discussion addresses the concerns of delegates
as to whether endowment land should be sold, held on to, or "sell some of the land and keep the
other." Id. at 2. In the end, the Framers adopted a policy where the endowment land would "be
managed according to private trust law and free from political influence and considerations." Id. at
8. The public auction requirement was not a basis for the Framers decisions in this regard. Under
private trust law there are many mechanisms that could be utilized to protect from pillaging and to
maximize long-term financial returns for endowment land Beneficiaries. See generally, George G.
Bogert, The Law ofTrusts and Trusties § 551 (2011), see also I.C. § 68-106. The Framers would not
have wanted to restrict the discretion of the State legislature and the Land Board by requiring that all
leases be subject to public auction. Rather, private trust law sufficiently ensures that endowment
land is managed in the best interests of the Beneficiaries. Id.
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by "indiscriminate restrictions"), with Hart, at 755-56 (Mf. Reid arguing what "other disposition"
meant: "Now this gives the power to sell and dispose of these lands by sale, lease, or any other way.
Now we come in and put a limitation on it how? Sell it, but sell it at public auction? Now the
legislature may come in and provide that it may be sold on the installment plan .... "). Analyzing
the constitutional convention debates regarding public school lands leads to the conclusion that the
Framers were passionate about how Idaho's school lands were to be managed. Id. Moreover, a
thorough analysis of the debates demonstrates that the Framers did not intend the term "disposal"
and the public auction directive to apply to all leases of state land because the Framers did not want
to restrain the management of state land to that extent. See generally, Hart, at 703-65; Colson,
Idaho's Constitution: The Tie That Binds, at 118-121.
In addition to the vigorous debates on the issue, further evidence of the Framers' intent that
"disposal" only applied to sales of state land is demonstrated by the actions ofIdaho's early state
legislatures-many members of which were also delegates at the constitutional convention. One
such Act provided that the Land Board could lease state land without being required to submit the
lease to public auction. 1893 Idaho Sess. Laws 141, 144-45. Rather, the Act merely required an
application to lease the land, an affidavit stating that the applicant did not own a lease of state lands
in excess of 160 acres (or 640 acres if agricultural), and an amount of rent computed from the date of
the application to the following January 1st. Id. Significantly, however, the Act required an auction
only if two or more persons desired to lease the same tract ofland (i.e., a conflict auction). Id. This
Act ofIdaho' s early state legislature demonstrates the Framers' intent that leases were not disposals.
Otherwise, no lease could issue without a public auction. The conflict auction provision ofthis early

CROSS-APPELLANTS' RESPONSE BRIEF, Page 22

legislative act was obviously seen as a mechanism available to maximize long-term financial returns
to endowment land Beneficiaries when there were two (2) or more applications. Had the Framers
truly intended that all leases of state endowment lands be subject to public auctions, early
legislatures would surely have passed a law requiring public auctions for all leases. They did not.
The Attorney General's argument regarding Idaho's constitutional convention debates fixates
on a set of successful and unsuccessful amendments to Article IX, Section 8, for support.
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 33-34. The Attorney General argues that these amendments indicate
that the Framers used the term "sale" as a requirement on one form of property transaction, and used
the term "disposal" to capture other types of real property transactions including the rental ofland.
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 34. The problem with the Attorney General's argument, as previously
pointed out, is that the argument fixates on a minute subsection and closing remarks, and then uses
them as definitive evidence of the Framers' entire intent. Id. As demonstrated above, the Article IX,
Section 8, debate-as a whole-shows that the Framers did not intend for all leases of endowment
land to be subject to public auctions. Hart, at 703-65. If the Framers had intended such restrictions
on the management of endowment land, they would have expressly said so.
Even today, there are multiple categories of school land leases that are not subject to conflict
auctions, which indicates the Land Board, Department of Lands, and the Idaho Legislature do not
believe leases constitute disposals subject to public auction. For example, Idaho law specifically
exempts commercial land leases from conflict auctions. I.C. § 58-307(11). The Land Board is
authorized to unilaterally set rental rates for state-owned submerged and formerly submerged lands,
and no provision exists for conflict auctions in the event two or more individuals apply to lease the
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same area. See I.C. § 47-714. Existing Lessees of mineral right leases are afforded a preferential
right under certain circumstances that exempts them from conflict auctions for a two-year period.

See I.C. § 47-704. Recently amended Idaho Code § 47-1605 provides that geothermal leases may be
awarded pursuant to a variety of options-only one of which involves competitive bidding. Further,
the Land Board is authorized to lease any portion of the old penitentiary site to private persons,
firms, or corporations for a term not to exceed fifty years without a conflict auction. I.C. § 58-337.
The lack of a public auction mandate directing that any of these state leases be subject to public
auctions further confirms that leases are not considered a disposal under Article IX, Section 8.
4.

The Two Provisions of Article IX, Section 8, Can Be Interpreted Harmoniously,
Which Compels the Conclusion that Leases are Not "Disposals" Subject to Public
Auction

Article IX, Section 8, pronounces two important directives relating to cottage site leases:
first, state lands must be managed "in such a manner as will secure the maximum long-term fmancial
return to the institution to which granted;" second, state lands must be "carefully preserved and held
in trust, subject to disposal at public auction for the use and benefit of the respective object for which
said grants of land were made." Idaho Const. art. IX, § 8. These two clauses both require acting in
the best interest of the Beneficiaries, but will conflict to the extent disposal at public auction does not
secure the maximum long-term financial return to the Beneficiaries.
"[P]rovisions of the Constitution, insofar as they relate to the same subject matter, must be
construed together." Idaho Press Club v. State Legislature a/the State, 142 Idaho 640, 644, 132
P.3d 397, 401 (2006). Further, "it is a principle of constitutional interpretation that provisions
apparently in conflict must be reconciled, if at all possible." Idaho Power Co. v. State, By and
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Through Dep't of Water Res., 104 Idaho 570, 573, 661 P.2d 736, 740 (1983). Only where an

irreconcilable conflict exists will the court resort to methods of statutory or constitutional
interpretation which would have one provision prevail over another. Id. In this case, Idaho Code

§ 58-31 OA 's exemption of cottage site leases from the conflict auction provisions and requirement to
charge market rent ensures leases generate maximum long-term returns throughout the duration of
the lease as required by Aliicle IX, Section 8. The State's own report commissioned from the
University ofIdaho concedes that out of the various options available to maximize long-term returns,
auctions involve the most financial risk to the State. R. Exh. 2, Exh. C, p. 2l.
By exempting cottage site leases from conflict auctions, Lessees are encouraged to develop
and maintain their leaseholds. This development and maintenance produces increased revenues for
the Beneficiaries. In other words, by interpreting the disposal language of Article IX, Section 8, as
applying only to fee simple interests, the Land Board is able to ensure leases generate maximum
long-term financial returns. A contrary interpretation ties the hands of the Land Board, in direct
contravention of the holding in Allen v. Smylie that the Land Board's obligation to ensure maximum
returns gives it broad discretion in leasing, including the ability to initiate offers to lease through
avenues other than public auction. Allen v. Smylie, 92 Idaho 846, 852,452 P.2d 343, 349 (1969). It
is counterintuitive that the Land Board's ability to ensure maximum long-term returns will actually
be improved by restricting the options it has in managing state lands. If the Attorney General
believes public auctions are the only means to maximize long-term financial returns, then it is his
burden to establish facts supporting his position. Moon v. State Ed. Of Land Comm 'rs, 111 Idaho
389,392, 724 P.2d 125, 128 (1986). He has not met, and cannot meet, that burden.
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Significantly, the Attorney General once concluded that the disposal language in Article IX,
Section 8, did not encompass cottage site leases in a 1990 Legal Guideline issued to a legislator
concerning then-proposed Idaho Code § 58-310A. R. Exh. 11, Exh. H; Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No.
032390 (1990). Interestingly enough, the legal opinion is authored by Deputy Attorney General
Steven Strack, who submitted an Affidavit in support of the Attorney General's Motion For
Summary Judgment Re: Constitutionality of Idaho Code § 58-31OA before the district court.
Although Deputy Strack attached to his Affidavit a copy of a 2009 legal opinion he co-authored
finding Idaho Code § 58-31 OA unconstitutional, he failed to attach a copy of the 1990 opinion he
authored advising the chairman of the House Agricultural Affairs Committee that Idaho Code § 58310A was constitutional. Compare Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 09-1 (2009), with Idaho Op. Atty.
Gen. No. 032390 (1990).
Deputy Strack's 1990 analysis relied on many of the same Idaho Supreme Court cases cited
above for the conclusion that the public auction provision applies only where fee simple title is
conveyed. Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 032390, pp. 4-5. Notably, Deputy Strack analyzed the issue in
terms of whether Idaho Code § 58-31 OA could possibly be interpreted in a constitutional fashion,
and expressly advised that legislative acts are presumed constitutional unless clearly not susceptible
to a valid constitutional interpretation. ld at 6. Deputy Strack concluded it was possible to interpret
Article IX, Section 8, as vesting in the Land Board the discretion to lease state lands through
methods other than public auction, and, therefore, Idaho Code § 58-310A would likely survive
constitutional scrutiny. ld
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Neither the Attorney General's subsequent 2009 Advisory Opinion, nor the Idaho Watershed
cases alter this conclusion. In stark contrast to his 1990 legal opinion, Deputy Strack's 2009
Opinion is a piece of advocacy that does not even attempt to create the appearance of an unbiased
interpretation of Idaho Code § 58-310A.

He instead excessively exhausts all avenues of

interpretation in an attempt to persuade the reader the statute is unconstitutional. See R. Exh. 2;
Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 09-1 (2009).

Gone is the recognition that statutes are presumed

constitutional, and the acknowledgement that the law only requires a constitutional interpretation be
possible in order to uphold a statute.
As stated previously, it is both possible and logical to interpret Idaho Code § 58-31 OA in a
constitutional manner. The plain meaning of the word "disposal," the Idaho Supreme Court's
decisions on the issue, and the constitutional and legislative history following Idaho's admission to
the Union indicate leases were never intended to be treated as disposals under Article IX, Section 8.
The Attorney General has reached a similar conclusion in the past, although he now disavows that
analysis. The Idaho Watershed cases did not hold cottage site leases were required to be submitted
to public auction, nor did they conclude that Idaho Code § 58-310A was unconstitutional. The Idaho
Legislature has never interpreted Article IX, Section 8, as requiring public auctions for all leases.
Rather, conflict auctions have been mandated when two (2) or more bidders exist. Conflict auctions
are merely one method of determining how to maximize long-term financial returns when there are
conflicting requests to lease the same land. As such, a harmonious reading of the public auction and
maximizing long-term returns language of Article IX, Section 8, compels the conclusion that leases

CROSS-APPELLANTS' RESPONSE BRIEF, Page 27

are not disposals subject to public auction. Therefore, the Court should hold that Idaho Code § 58310A is constitutional.
5.

Invalidation ofIdaho Code § 58-310A Will Not Resolve the Attorney General's
Concerns

An examination of the history of this case, as outlined by the Attorney General's "Statement
of the Case," demonstrates what he is really seeking: the Land Board to charge market rent as
required by Idaho Code § 58-310A. Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 1-15. Although the Attorney
General has relaxed this argument before this Court, prior briefing before the district court
demonstrates why the Attorney General brought this action in the first place:
By ignoring the Constitution's unequivocal direction, the 1990 Act interfered with at
least one purpose of the public auction requirement: to use the give-and-take of the
free market as a mechanism for securing maximum long-tenn financial return for the
endowment land beneficiaries. R. Vol. I, p. 53. (Emphasis added).
The Supreme Court invalidated Idaho Code § 58-31 OB because it impennissibly
directed the Land Board to consider interests other than the endowment land
beneficiaries in making leasing detenninations; so, too, § 58-31OA reflects the
Legislature's detennination to ameliorate existing lessees' "consternation and
dismay" by removing the market force mechanism implicit in a public auction and
substituting the Land Board's market rent assessment. R. Vol. I, p. 57, n 4. (Italics
in original, underlining added).
In so doing, the Act ran directly counter to the explicit language of Article IX,
Section 8, and imposed on the Board a duty-i.e., to make "market rent"
assessments-that the Constitution's drafters committed to public auction processes
in the first instance. R. Vol. I, pp. 61-62. (Emphasis added).
The Attorney General has repeatedly emphasized that Idaho Code § 58-31 OA is
unconstitutional because the Land Board is either unable or unwilling to determine what constitutes
market rent when it comes to cottage site leases. ld., pp. 52-63; Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 1-15.
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Although the Attorney General presented no evidence on the issue and therefore failed to meet his
burden, the argument both expressly and implicitly urges that only conflict auctions can detennine
market rent and thus maximize the long-term financial return to endowment land Beneficiaries.
While Lessees do not agree that the Land Board previously set market rent too low, the remedy the
Attorney General seeks-the declaration of Idaho Code § 58-31 OA as unconstitutional-will not
resolve his concerns.
Further, in the event Idaho Code § 58-310A is declared unconstitutional, cottage site lease
applications will be subject to conflict auctions under Idaho Code § 58-310. That statute provides:
When two (2) or more persons apply to lease the same land, the director of the
Department of Lands, or his agent, shall, at a stated time, and at such place as he may
designate, auction off and lease the land to the applicant who will pay the highest
premium bid therefore, the annual rent to be established by the state board of land
commISSIOners.
I.C. § 58-310(1). (Emphasis added). As such, regardless ofwhetherIdaho Code § 58-31 OA survives
this Court's constitutional scrutiny, the Land Board will continue to set cottage site rental rates.
Declaring Idaho Code § 58-31 OA unconstitutional does absolutely nothing to resolve the Attorney
General's concerns.
To be sure, if the Attorney General has his way, he will have eviscerated the market rate
requirement for cottage site leases because the requirement only appears in Idaho Code § 58-31 OA.
Moreover, the only time auctions will occur will be when two (2) or more persons apply to lease the
same land (i.e., conflict auction). If a public auction is required by the Idaho Constitution, it is not
just required in a conflict situation, but for the leasing of any cottage site or other endowment lands.
If no one bids at an auction, presumably no lease could issue. Under such circumstances, it is
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unclear how this type of management of endowment land would secure the maximum long-term
financial returns to the Beneficiaries.
6.

Public Policy Supports Finding Idaho Code § 58-31 OA Constitutional Because it
Secures the Maximum Long-Term Financial Return to Endowment Land
Beneficiaries

Idaho Code Section 58-31 OA requires that market rent be generated throughout the duration
of a lease, and it assures that Lessees will not be deprived of their leaseholds as long as they continue
to pay market rent. This situation encourages Lessees to continue leasing and improving the
leaseholds. Further, this continued tenancy and improvement to the property maximizes the longterm financial returns to the Beneficiaries of the state endowment lands, which is consistent with the
constitutional requirements contained in Article IX, Section 8. In Lipscomb v. Columbus Mun.

Separate Sch. Dist., 269 F.3d 494,510-11 (5 th Cir. 2001), the United States Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals recognized the benefit of school land leases in Mississippi:
In discharging its obligations to administer the lands for the benefit of education,
Mississippi faced certain realities. Unsettled land generates no revenue for the State;
yields no agricultural bounty; supports no population; and generates no commerce.

[T]o this day Mississippi continues to receive its bargained-for benefit from these
leases, just as the leaseholders reap the benefit of (now) extremely favorable rental
rates. The leases have generated a constant stream of revenue that is secured by the
State's continuing ownership in the land. For the first 50 years or so the rental
income sustained the schools. The guarantee of perpetual low lease rates attracted
settlement in Columbus, and the leaseholders improved the land they held, increasing
the general wealth of the community and enlarging the tax base for later property
taxes to support schools.
!d. If the Attorney General's argument is accepted, Idaho's system of stable leases will likely be

destroyed. In its place will be a system where the Land Board still sets the rents for leaseholds, but
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without the requirement to charge market rent. Risk will be introduced into the market by conflict
auctions, thereby decreasing the long-term financial returns to the Beneficiaries. Moreover, it is
counterintuitive that any Idahoans would want to lease and improve property when there is a risk
that the property will be lost at the conclusion of the leasehold. What motivation does a person have
to increase the value and desirability to hold a lease of land when that land will subsequently be
auctioned to the highest bidder? Idaho Code § 58-31 OA promotes stability and increases maximum
long-term financial returns for the Beneficiaries. Thus, Idaho Code § 58-31 OA is consistent with the
Land Board's duties under Article IX, Section 8.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons stated above, this Court should hold that Idaho Code § 58-31 OA is
constitutional under Article IX, Section 8.
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